The Story of the Six-Day War

The eleven years that had elapsed between 1956 and 1967 were the most tranquil, the most peaceful, the most fertile and progressive years in Israel’s history. The economy flourished, immigration had increased; Israel’s international position was broadening year by year. The Foreign office established over 91 Israeli embassies in all the five continents. Israel wanted nothing except a continuance of that movement of consolidation.

Syrian air raids from the North, in April 1967, indicated that tranquility had not been achieved; Syrian shelling from the Golan Heights terrorized the border kibbutzim. In May tension increased when the Soviet Union sent false reports to President Nasser of Egypt of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria. Nasser responded by ordering his troops to move into Sinai after he had demanded the removal of United Nations forces from Gaza and the Sinai. Soon after came his most dramatic move; Nasser declared a naval blockade of the Straights of Tiran, cutting off Israel’s approaches to Asia and East Africa, and denying access to Persian Gulf oil.

Egypt had placed Israel in a strangulate hold. The winds of war had been set in motion as Nasser announced to the world: “the Straights of Tiran are part of Egypt’s territorial waters. No Israeli ships will ever navigate them again.”

One link after another created a chain, Soviet incitement, Syrian paranoia and Egypt, almost reluctantly was drawn into the fray. Having been drawn in, Egypt became intoxicated by the lack of international opposition, and by fabricated intelligence reports that Israel no longer under Ben-Gurion, but under Levi Eshkol, was very unlikely to respond militarily to the blockade or to the troop concentrations.

That is the story of the Six-Day War, the most unwanted war in Israel’s history. The blockade was a blatant act of war, and if Nasser could get away with this he could go on committing aggressions against Israel at will.

“Israel prepared for the worst. In Tel Aviv, air raid shelters were opened, hospitals prepared for mass casualties, and kibbutzim fortified. Friends and relatives abroad offered to take the children to safety. There was fear in the land and dread of a new holocaust.

When asked, what Israeli diplomats could do, the Chief of Staff said nervously, “give us time to move our forces south and prepare for war.”

How to react? That was the central issue which was passionately debated in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament.

Following Nasser’s actions and the Arab threats, it became vital for the Israeli government to explore every alternative avenue before committing the nation to war. Foreign Minister Eban was asked to go to Washington to rally the support of President Johnson and meet with other western leaders. A meeting with President De Gaulle was crucial. France was Israel’s principal supplier of weapons and aircraft and had been a firm ally since the fifties. De Gaulle’s words even before Eban sat down were “al met par aguere,” do not make war. He didn’t see the blockade as an act of war. He gave Eban to understand that he feared and fully believed that an Israeli-Egyptian war would expand into some cataclysmic global disaster. “As I looked at him again,” said Eban, “I felt our greatest friend, who had sustained us for the past decade, had abandoned us.”

In London, Eban met with Prime Minister Harold Wilson who was far more sympathetic. President Johnson was committed to keeping the Straits of Tiran open, but Eban knew that the Viet Nam War had weakened his authority. He said, “you are the victims of aggression and I would like to break the blockade with an international force; Israel will not be alone unless it decides to be alone.” Prime Minister Eshkol tried every possible way to avoid a military confrontation by calling on Israel’s friends to stop the escalation of the Egyptian blockade and the amassing of their armies at Israel’s borders. It was doubtful that Israel would get naval help, but President Johnson would not stand in the way of any action that Israel might take alone.

This Eban reported immediately on his return, but his sugar-coated reporting was questioned by the military hierarchy and by many members of his own party. Even before Eban’ s return, the Prime minister dispatched General Amit, the head of the Mosad, on a secret mission to Washington to find out the degree of the American commitment to stop the bellicose actions of Nasser.

In Tel Aviv the ruling Mapai party secretariat held marathon sessions, chaired by Golda Meir. The meeting room was charged with suspense and tension, notes were handed over to the chair reporting of the unrest in the streets where demonstrating women, agitated by the Rafi leadership, were calling to unseat the government.

Rumors were spread about a meeting of the senior military command where generals were calling for the ouster of the government, whispering that the Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, the veteran commander from the war of independence and the Sinai campaign of 1956, was suffering a nervous breakdown. Add to all his troubles, Prime Minister Eshkol was urged to come up with a calming statement to the nation. Totally unprepared, he was handed a convoluted statement written by Minister Galili. The PM stumbled over the text while his speech was broadcast live over the radio; this unlucky episode together with political infighting, undermined the public’s trust in him as a military leader.

These ill-fated events took place against the gloomy background of a deep fear that a bloody war with Egypt was inevitable. Since the last week of May Israeli forces had mobilized in response to Nasser’s threats but this complete mobilization without a clear purpose on the horizon was something Israel had never undergone before. In psychological and emotional terms it was almost unbearable for the nation to endure.

The troubling aspect was the weakening confidence in Levi Eshkol, the Minister of Defense. He could make hard and brave decisions, but now he had to stand against his own weak-kneed party friends who were carried away by fear. Viewing his friends stand up, one by one, talking about the probable loss of 40,000 Israeli casualties, he gave in to the demand that Moshe Dayan, the hero of past wars, replace him as the Minister of Defense.

In the face of Israel’s most serious crisis since independence, an emergency national unity government was formed which brought Menachem Begin, the leader of the opposition, into the cabinet. This made for no difference in strategy as battle plans had already been set, but the effect on the national morale was enormous as the country was facing the most unwanted war in Israel’s history.

Arabs everywhere were encouraged to join the Jihad, the Holy War against Israel, to avenge the1948 defeat. While media coverage of the Arab buildup created anguish and suspense, so grew the solidarity for Israel around the world, the idea of an attack and the extinction of Israel were horrifying. Nasser’s saying that he wanted to destroy Israel, created in Israelis a natural reaction to say if that’s going to happen, then let’s do something first. In Egypt and Syria preparations were already reaching a climax. Iraq and Saudi Arabia now pledged forces to the battle. Nasser declared to the Egyptian parliament: “our goal is to destroy Israel.” King Hussein of Jordan signed a mutual defense pact with Nasser placing his forces under Egyptian command. Now as the Arab world united for the battle with Israel, King Hussein found himself drawn to its center.

Rhetoric, whether it is moderate or extreme, does have either an appeasing or an inflammatory effect in action and not only in words.

Demonstrations of solidarity with Israel took place throughout the free world. It seemed that Israel’s existence was clearly at stake. War was almost a certainty. The only question was when and if war started who could guess where it would end?

On June 4, the Israeli cabinet met for seven long hours, the days of anguish, deliberation, and suspense were over. Prime Minister Eshkol called for the vote. Each of the ministers knew exactly what his responsibility was and what was to be decided. Life or death for soldiers, for citizens, who knows, perhaps for the nation itself, all this was hanging in the balance. All hands were raised, there was no choice, and yes, Israel was going to war.

In the early dawn of Monday morning June the fifth, Israeli jets sped toward Egyptian targets, General Moti Hod was in command of the air force, his objective was clear. In less than three hours, three hundred Egyptians combat fighter planes had been destroyed.

On the same morning, a three-pronged armored attack was launched in Sinai, Israeli forces moved swiftly destroying the fiercest opposition. By the end of the second day of the war Israeli armor had occupied the Gaza Strip, had smashed major Egyptian defense positions and commanded all Sinai routes leading to the west and south; nevertheless, the Egyptians continued broadcasting news reports announcing immense Egyptian gains and huge Israeli losses. From the first hours of June the fifth, after the outbreak of hostilities with Egypt, Israel’s most urgent aim was to avoid Jordanian involvement and stop their heavy shelling of West Jerusalem. A letter from Prime Minister Eshkol calling upon King Hussein to avoid becoming involved was forwarded to the United Nations Chief of Staff requesting it be taken urgently and immediately to Amman. Assured of Arab success, Jordan tragically and with disastrous consequences opened fire along the entire front and in Western Jerusalem. The Jordanians inflicted a tremendous number of Israeli casualties, mainly civilians, but by Wednesday June the seventh Israeli forces had captured most of the West Bank.

The main battle now moved to Jerusalem. Jerusalem was a divided city; the front ran through its center separating Jerusalem into East held by Jordan and West held by Israel. East Jerusalem was captured in one of the most savage battles of the war involving artillery, armor, infantry and hand-to-hand combat. Finally, the Old City was encircled and the last Jordanian were troops trapped inside. The military were waiting for instructions. A cabinet meeting was held in the air-raid shelter of the Knesset. The cabinet deliberated the capture of the Old City, knowing that in order to protect the holy places it would have to be captured street by street and the battle would be very costly. The order was given to commence the attack. Would an Israeli victory be canceled by United Nations pressure? All eyes were on the UN Security Council.

No decision had yet been taken about action against Syria. While Prime Minister Eshkol visited the area, Eban received a call from a high U.S. official who hinted that it would be illogical if the war were to end with the Syrians suffering no penalty for having provoked it. This point was also seriously argued by the farmers of the many Kibbutzim who had been subject to Syrian shelling for years. While the fate of the Golan was being debated, Moshe Dayan questioned the move for imminent fear of Soviet involvement. Despite the call for action, Dayan delayed the operation until Saturday gaining time asking, “and what will the Russians say?”

With General Elazar in command of the Northern Front it was decided to go ahead and storm the Golan Heights and silence the guns that had been pounding since the beginning of the hostilities. The attack began on Friday June the ninth. It was an almost impossible mission. The stark hills of the Golan Heights were fortified ten miles deep and defended by artillery, armor, and mine fields. The Syrians had dug themselves in on a massive scale; nevertheless, Israeli tanks and bulldozers began the assent with the infantry following. The frontal attack was successful but the proximity of the Syrian defenses, the aerial bombardment and the frequent hand-to-hand fighting made this one of the bloodiest encounters of the war.

On Saturday the troops pushed on wiping out the last pockets of resistance and by the afternoon the entire Golan Heights were in Israeli hands. In Sinai Israeli troops had continued their advance destroying Egyptian armor and military installations and taking thousands of prisoners. By June 8th all Sinai was in Israeli hands and the blockade of Eilat was ended. The final target, the Suez Canal, had been captured placing astride one of the great water ways of international commerce.

By evening of June the tenth a cease fire had been agreed upon by all parties. The land fell quiet. Israel had lived six unforgettable days. The losses, 750 Israeli soldiers killed, two thousand wounded. Israel now controlled territories four times its previous size and the unbelievable had happened; after nineteen years of absence and after great pain and loss, Israel had returned to the heart of Jerusalem.

After the Six-Day War a mass euphoria engulfed the nation. Israelis began to take in the newly enlarged land of Israel rediscovering sites intimately connected to the Bible. The most dramatic achievement of the Six-Day War was the return to Old Jerusalem and to the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, the symbolic center of the Jewish faith which had been barred to Jews for nineteen years.