The Myth of the Palestinian People

While everyone speaks about the plight of the Palestinians and Israeli-occupied Palestine, one question never seems to be addressed: Who are the Palestinians? Who really are these people who claim the Holy Land as their own? What is their history? Where did they come from? How did they arrive in the country they call Philistine?

The general impression given in the “free” media is that Palestinians have lived in the Holy Land for hundreds if not thousands of years. No wonder, then, that a recent poll of French citizens shows that the majority believes that prior to the establishment of the State of Israel an independent Arab Palestinian state existed in its place. Yet curiously, when it comes to giving the history of this “ancient people,” most news outlets find it harder to go back more than the early 1900’s. The CNN news agency has devoted countless hours of airtime to the “plight” of the Palestinians, detailing the history of the region using maps dated only from 1917 on. The CBS news website has a background section called “A Struggle for Middle East Peace”; its historical timeline dates no earlier than 1897. The NBC news background section called “Searching for Peace” has a timeline starting in 1916 and the BBC’s timeline starts in 1948.

While the modern media may be short on information about the history of the “Palestinian People,” the historical record is totally ignored. According to dozens of visitors to the region, “Palestine,” the land of Israel, was, until the beginning of the last century, practically empty. Alphonse de Lamartine visited the land in 1835. In his book Recollections of the East, he writes “Outside the gates of Jerusalem we saw no living object, heard no living sound.” The famous American author Mark Twain, who visited the land of Israel in 1867, confirms this observation. In his book Innocents Abroad, he writes, “Desolation is here that not even imagination can grace with the pomp of life in action. We reached Tabor safely. We never saw a human being on the whole journey.” Even the British Consul in Palestine reported in 1857, “The country is in a considerable degree empty of inhabitants and therefore its greatest need is that of a body of population.”

The term Palestine — which is mentioned for the first time in the writing of the Greek historian Herodotus (fifth century B.C.E.) — denoted at first the coastal strip inhabited by the Philistines in the biblical period.

However, after Bar Kochba’s revolt was put down by the Romans in 135 C.E., the name Palestine was attached officially to the territory that earlier had been the Kingdom of Judea and the name of Jerusalem was changed to Aelia Capitolina. That was in keeping with the policy of the Roman rulers: to abstruse, even uproot, everything suggestive of a Jewish national existence. From the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E. until the establishment of British rule after the First World War, Palestine was not a politically distinct country. Throughout this entire period — with the exception of the relatively short period of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem — Palestine was a geographical unit comprising two districts, which were administrative units, whose boundaries and divisions changed from time to time within the framework of a wider framework. These two districts were, during the days of Roman and Byzantine rule, the provinces Palaestina Prima and Palaestina Secunda, and after the Muslim conquest were called fund Filastin and fund al-Urdunn. Today, they more or less correspond to the territories of Israel and Jordan.

Throughout this long period, which lasted about 1850 years, Palestine was ruled intermittently from various capitals: Rome, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and once again Istanbul (Byzantium, Constantinople), the capital of the Ottoman Empire, which conquered Palestine in 1517 and ruled it for 400 years. Formally, Palestine was ruled from Istanbul, the distant capital of the Empire, but in practice it was run from Damascus, the residence of the governor of Syria, whose territory included the administrative units that comprised Palestine. Palestine was thus considered part of Syria and was called Suriya el-fanubiyya, or “southern Syria,” and there was nothing of a national nature that distinguished its inhabitants from the rest of the Arabs of “Greater Syria.” During the Ottoman rule, the Arabs did not, for the most part, have specific national features. The individual's immediate loyalty was to his family and tribe, and beyond that there was the loyalty to the religious community. For the vast majority of the Arabs, that was the Muslim community. This loyalty was also expressed in identification with the Ottoman Empire, which was a Muslim kingdom. Within the framework of Ottoman rule no real importance was attached to matters of ethnic origin, nor were language differences very important.

The Jerusalem elite was fluent in Turkish, and Arabic was at the core of Islamic education throughout the Empire. In this context, there was no basis for Arab separatist movements. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century a movement of Arab cultural awakening began, which, in the course of time, also led to the establishment of various political associations that began to manifest nationalistic leanings. It is generally acknowledged that the number of those advocating a distinctive Arab identity at that time was very small.

Among the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire there were, on the eve of the First World War, two currents: an Arab national current that advocated Arab independence apart from the Turks, that was supported only by a small number of people; and a second current, supported by most Arabs in the Empire, advocating Arab patriotism, but only within the wider framework of Ottoman patriotism.

Among the Arabs of Palestine the prevailing current in that period was, like in the rest of the region, Ottoman orientation, supported by Jerusalem notables cultivated by the Ottoman regime and enjoying considerable autonomy and influence, as well as by the notables of the north. This pro-Ottoman orientation was also forcefully expressed by the Arab newspaper of that period, Filastin. It should be stressed, however, that even though the national current as a whole was very weak, the rejection of Zionism and the struggle against it — which was a major element in the national current, as became evident later — occupied an important place in it even then.

Palestinian Nationalism

There is no ignoring the fact that a certain group of people had a notion of Palestinian national distinctiveness and were striving to establish a separate independent Palestinian political entity apart from all other Arab political entities as well as destroying any Zionist activity in the region. These people, whatever their number, believed in their cause and were prepared to give up their lives for it. In order to achieve this goal, they used murderous terror against defenseless people including Arab Muslims and Christians, Jews and British soldiers of the mandate. They had no qualms about killing women and children in their pursuit.

Following the Allies' victories which concluded World War I, support gradually grew for the Arab revolt. After the conquest of Damascus in October 1918 and the establishment of the ‘Sharifian authority’ under the supreme authority of General Allenby, commander of the British expeditionary force, the idea of unifying Palestine and Syria, or as it was then presented, of joining “Southern Syria” to the framework of “Greater Syria,” became widespread. To implement this idea, two clubs were established: the Literary Club (al-Muntada' al-Adabi) and the Arab Club (al-Nadi al-Arabi) whose declared objectives were: Arab independence within the framework of Palestine's unification with Syria, war against Zionism, the prevention of Jewish immigration and the rescinding of foreign capitulations. These clubs were comprised of young educated Muslims from elite families: members of the Nashashibi family in the Literary Club and the Husseinis in the Arab Club. Two additional clubs, less important and somewhat secretive, were set up to assist the activity of the former clubs by providing protection for its meetings, organizing demonstrations, etc. They were the Association of Brotherhood and Purity (al-Ikha wa-al-'Afaf) and the Association of Self-Sacrificers (al-Fidaiyya).

In January 1919, the first congress of the Arabs of Palestine convened in Jerusalem and, stating that the only way to counter the Zionist threat was by unification with Syria, resolved that Palestine (Suriya el-Janubiyya) was part of Greater Syria. The Jerusalem leadership, behind which stood the British Authority, did not embrace this decision and preferred a separation from Syria, but the enthusiasm and extremism of the younger elements upped the scale in favor of unification with Syria, which at that time was the prevailing orientation in the Arab national movement in Palestine.

It is important to note that only after the disturbances of 1929 did the political star of the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseni, begin to ascend.

The Islamic Congress, which convened in Jerusalem at the end of 1931 on his initiative and with him presiding, was the first expression and the beginning of Arab and Muslim involvement in affairs of Palestine, although not yet on a governmental level. The Mufti’s first break from the principle of general Arab non-involvement; widened in the 1930s, causing a rift with Emir Abdulla of Trans-Jordan.

The 1936 Arab revolt against the loathed British rule which allowed limited Jewish immigration started a process in which leaders of neighboring Arab countries became partners with local leadership in influencing regional political conduct and in determining the future and fate of the Palestinians.

At the end of the process they had become the exclusive deciders, with the Palestinians themselves not having much of a say. This process was the result of a conscious policy on the part of the local leadership to involve the Arab governments in the Palestine issue. The factors leading up to this policy were the weakness of the official Palestine leadership, and its knowledge that it did not have control over the situation, but rather that the gangs and advocates of “armed struggle” did not obey any outside authority and continued to do as they pleased. All these factors impelled the Jerusalem leadership to obtain the help of the surrounding Arab countries and their rulers in order to get backing for their position. The assessment of the Jerusalem leadership was that as a result of rising tension in the world and the growing importance of Middle East oil, Great Britain would need the support of the Arab governments. This need could be exploited for the benefit of the Arabs of Palestine; therefore, the rulers of the Arab countries should be enlisted for the Palestinian cause, a move receiving the full support of the British government, who would have no business with the local leadership under their sworn enemy the Jerusalem Mufti.

This policy did in fact bear fruit. The Arab rulers were brought in to mediate and, as a result of their scheming with the British, the first part of the revolt came to an end in October 1936. General Arab involvement continued and even received formal recognition when the Arab states were invited (as an official partner) to the round-table held at Saint James Palace in London, a conference which led to the anti-Zionist policy stipulated in the 1939 “White Paper.” It is contended by some that it was the British who first pressed the Arab countries to get involved in the Palestine issue. Nevertheless, credit for the first initiative goes to Haj Amin el-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and to the Arab Palestinian leadership. Even after the establishment of the State of Israel, the situation did not change. Arab countries had become the exclusive decision-makers regarding the Palestine issue, with the Palestinians themselves having no significant say.

Examining the roots of the movement for Palestinian distinctiveness, we discover that it crystallized only during and after the 1936 Arab revolt.

Years later the PLO, led by Egyptian-born Yasser Arafat, and several of its radical organizations professing to represent the “Palestinian people,” had been strongly protesting the general Arab trusteeship over the region, trying to free themselves of it. Eventually, it became more accepted among the Arab countries that the Palestinian Arabs would be allowed to play a limited part in the determination of their own future while the neighboring countries continue to serve as a surrogate in the “Interest” of the Palestinian people.

Jerusalem 1967

This picture was the first published at the liberation of the Temple mount and the first picture allowed into the world press. The original caption read: "Foreign correspondents on the background of El Aktza." From left to right: Professor Shmuel Almog, an IDF officer, Dr. Binyamin Eliav, a sound technician, and Dr. Zvi Almog (author of this blog).

On the bright morning of Wednesday the 7th of June 1967, Dr. Binyamin Eliav, adviser to Prime Minister Eshkol, my brother, Shmuel Almog, who directed Israel’s public radio operations during the Six-Day War, and I, approached the Old City of Jerusalem from the east.

The Lions Gate was blocked by an Israeli half-track stalled in the entrance. A burning tank was situated before the entrance jamming the narrow road so no vehicle could pass. I left my car down the road and we entered the gate by foot. Snipers were still hidden in the buildings of the Old City and from time to time we could hear shooting in the distance.

Passing the Al-Aqsa mosque, we made our way down to the Western Wall of the ancient temple. Israeli paratroopers, mostly reservists, were resting in the shade after the bloody fighting. At the time there were only a few soldiers in front of the wall, praying with devotion, overcome by the solemn occasion, touching the enormous stones in disbelief.

It didn’t take long before Rabbi Goren, the Chief Rabbi of the Israeli armed forces, arrived and began blowing the shofar (a ram’s horn used for the rituals of the Jewish high holidays). Soldiers congregated around the rabbi, praying aloud, eyes glistening with tears. This was an event in world history that would never be forgotten.

Israel, for security reasons, was maintaining communications silence. We thought the first announcement to the Nation and the world about liberating the Old City should come from the Prime Minister himself, from the Kotel, the holiest place of historic Judaism.

My brother rushed to make a call to the PM’s office (using the military communication center), advising of the plan to broadcast the news directly from the scene. The Prime Minister was in no hurry, but in less then 20 minutes a helicopter bringing the Generals Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin and Uzi Narkis, all in uniform, marched to the Kotel, accompanied by photographers, foreign correspondents, radio and news reporters.

It was my opinion that an effort should be made to make the PM aware of the opportunity to depict Israel as a peace loving democratic nation and not as a country taken over by the military. I drove back with Binyamin Eliav to the Mandelbaum gate where thousands of Hasidim attempted to break through the barriers in a wild run for the Kotel. At the Gate, I found a civilian telephone and placed a call to my friend Aviad Yaffe, the director of the PM’s office. “Adi,” I said, “tell the PM that we are missing an historic opportunity to send to the world a most important message, namely, that Israel is a state of law and is not run by Generals.” Adi said, “The PM is busy receiving many delegations of well wishers, Druze, Maronites, Christians…” I interrupted, “Tell him to come right away. The delegations will have to wait, they have nowhere else to go”.

It took a while before the PM arrived. We mounted an army halftrack and began traveling to the Old City. The streets were strewn with bodies and the driver was maneuvering the vehicle in order to avoid the corpses.

While standing up on the half-track, Binyamin said, “Mr. Prime Minister, would it not be wise to seize the opportunity and create a Federation with the Arabs?” The PM chuckled and said in Yiddish “Binyumin, don’t be a fool, is that what we need, another Arab State to vote against us in the UN?”

The saga ended well: the news edition at 7:00 p.m. opened with the Prime Minister’s moving declaration of the liberation of Jerusalem and Israel’s triumph in the battle field. Only in the second item did the Generals’ voices chime in.

The Story of the Six-Day War

The eleven years that had elapsed between 1956 and 1967 were the most tranquil, the most peaceful, the most fertile and progressive years in Israel’s history. The economy flourished, immigration had increased; Israel’s international position was broadening year by year. The Foreign office established over 91 Israeli embassies in all the five continents. Israel wanted nothing except a continuance of that movement of consolidation.

Syrian air raids from the North, in April 1967, indicated that tranquility had not been achieved; Syrian shelling from the Golan Heights terrorized the border kibbutzim. In May tension increased when the Soviet Union sent false reports to President Nasser of Egypt of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria. Nasser responded by ordering his troops to move into Sinai after he had demanded the removal of United Nations forces from Gaza and the Sinai. Soon after came his most dramatic move; Nasser declared a naval blockade of the Straights of Tiran, cutting off Israel’s approaches to Asia and East Africa, and denying access to Persian Gulf oil.

Egypt had placed Israel in a strangulate hold. The winds of war had been set in motion as Nasser announced to the world: “the Straights of Tiran are part of Egypt’s territorial waters. No Israeli ships will ever navigate them again.”

One link after another created a chain, Soviet incitement, Syrian paranoia and Egypt, almost reluctantly was drawn into the fray. Having been drawn in, Egypt became intoxicated by the lack of international opposition, and by fabricated intelligence reports that Israel no longer under Ben-Gurion, but under Levi Eshkol, was very unlikely to respond militarily to the blockade or to the troop concentrations.

That is the story of the Six-Day War, the most unwanted war in Israel’s history. The blockade was a blatant act of war, and if Nasser could get away with this he could go on committing aggressions against Israel at will.

“Israel prepared for the worst. In Tel Aviv, air raid shelters were opened, hospitals prepared for mass casualties, and kibbutzim fortified. Friends and relatives abroad offered to take the children to safety. There was fear in the land and dread of a new holocaust.

When asked, what Israeli diplomats could do, the Chief of Staff said nervously, “give us time to move our forces south and prepare for war.”

How to react? That was the central issue which was passionately debated in the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament.

Following Nasser’s actions and the Arab threats, it became vital for the Israeli government to explore every alternative avenue before committing the nation to war. Foreign Minister Eban was asked to go to Washington to rally the support of President Johnson and meet with other western leaders. A meeting with President De Gaulle was crucial. France was Israel’s principal supplier of weapons and aircraft and had been a firm ally since the fifties. De Gaulle’s words even before Eban sat down were “al met par aguere,” do not make war. He didn’t see the blockade as an act of war. He gave Eban to understand that he feared and fully believed that an Israeli-Egyptian war would expand into some cataclysmic global disaster. “As I looked at him again,” said Eban, “I felt our greatest friend, who had sustained us for the past decade, had abandoned us.”

In London, Eban met with Prime Minister Harold Wilson who was far more sympathetic. President Johnson was committed to keeping the Straits of Tiran open, but Eban knew that the Viet Nam War had weakened his authority. He said, “you are the victims of aggression and I would like to break the blockade with an international force; Israel will not be alone unless it decides to be alone.” Prime Minister Eshkol tried every possible way to avoid a military confrontation by calling on Israel’s friends to stop the escalation of the Egyptian blockade and the amassing of their armies at Israel’s borders. It was doubtful that Israel would get naval help, but President Johnson would not stand in the way of any action that Israel might take alone.

This Eban reported immediately on his return, but his sugar-coated reporting was questioned by the military hierarchy and by many members of his own party. Even before Eban’ s return, the Prime minister dispatched General Amit, the head of the Mosad, on a secret mission to Washington to find out the degree of the American commitment to stop the bellicose actions of Nasser.

In Tel Aviv the ruling Mapai party secretariat held marathon sessions, chaired by Golda Meir. The meeting room was charged with suspense and tension, notes were handed over to the chair reporting of the unrest in the streets where demonstrating women, agitated by the Rafi leadership, were calling to unseat the government.

Rumors were spread about a meeting of the senior military command where generals were calling for the ouster of the government, whispering that the Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, the veteran commander from the war of independence and the Sinai campaign of 1956, was suffering a nervous breakdown. Add to all his troubles, Prime Minister Eshkol was urged to come up with a calming statement to the nation. Totally unprepared, he was handed a convoluted statement written by Minister Galili. The PM stumbled over the text while his speech was broadcast live over the radio; this unlucky episode together with political infighting, undermined the public’s trust in him as a military leader.

These ill-fated events took place against the gloomy background of a deep fear that a bloody war with Egypt was inevitable. Since the last week of May Israeli forces had mobilized in response to Nasser’s threats but this complete mobilization without a clear purpose on the horizon was something Israel had never undergone before. In psychological and emotional terms it was almost unbearable for the nation to endure.

The troubling aspect was the weakening confidence in Levi Eshkol, the Minister of Defense. He could make hard and brave decisions, but now he had to stand against his own weak-kneed party friends who were carried away by fear. Viewing his friends stand up, one by one, talking about the probable loss of 40,000 Israeli casualties, he gave in to the demand that Moshe Dayan, the hero of past wars, replace him as the Minister of Defense.

In the face of Israel’s most serious crisis since independence, an emergency national unity government was formed which brought Menachem Begin, the leader of the opposition, into the cabinet. This made for no difference in strategy as battle plans had already been set, but the effect on the national morale was enormous as the country was facing the most unwanted war in Israel’s history.

Arabs everywhere were encouraged to join the Jihad, the Holy War against Israel, to avenge the1948 defeat. While media coverage of the Arab buildup created anguish and suspense, so grew the solidarity for Israel around the world, the idea of an attack and the extinction of Israel were horrifying. Nasser’s saying that he wanted to destroy Israel, created in Israelis a natural reaction to say if that’s going to happen, then let’s do something first. In Egypt and Syria preparations were already reaching a climax. Iraq and Saudi Arabia now pledged forces to the battle. Nasser declared to the Egyptian parliament: “our goal is to destroy Israel.” King Hussein of Jordan signed a mutual defense pact with Nasser placing his forces under Egyptian command. Now as the Arab world united for the battle with Israel, King Hussein found himself drawn to its center.

Rhetoric, whether it is moderate or extreme, does have either an appeasing or an inflammatory effect in action and not only in words.

Demonstrations of solidarity with Israel took place throughout the free world. It seemed that Israel’s existence was clearly at stake. War was almost a certainty. The only question was when and if war started who could guess where it would end?

On June 4, the Israeli cabinet met for seven long hours, the days of anguish, deliberation, and suspense were over. Prime Minister Eshkol called for the vote. Each of the ministers knew exactly what his responsibility was and what was to be decided. Life or death for soldiers, for citizens, who knows, perhaps for the nation itself, all this was hanging in the balance. All hands were raised, there was no choice, and yes, Israel was going to war.

In the early dawn of Monday morning June the fifth, Israeli jets sped toward Egyptian targets, General Moti Hod was in command of the air force, his objective was clear. In less than three hours, three hundred Egyptians combat fighter planes had been destroyed.

On the same morning, a three-pronged armored attack was launched in Sinai, Israeli forces moved swiftly destroying the fiercest opposition. By the end of the second day of the war Israeli armor had occupied the Gaza Strip, had smashed major Egyptian defense positions and commanded all Sinai routes leading to the west and south; nevertheless, the Egyptians continued broadcasting news reports announcing immense Egyptian gains and huge Israeli losses. From the first hours of June the fifth, after the outbreak of hostilities with Egypt, Israel’s most urgent aim was to avoid Jordanian involvement and stop their heavy shelling of West Jerusalem. A letter from Prime Minister Eshkol calling upon King Hussein to avoid becoming involved was forwarded to the United Nations Chief of Staff requesting it be taken urgently and immediately to Amman. Assured of Arab success, Jordan tragically and with disastrous consequences opened fire along the entire front and in Western Jerusalem. The Jordanians inflicted a tremendous number of Israeli casualties, mainly civilians, but by Wednesday June the seventh Israeli forces had captured most of the West Bank.

The main battle now moved to Jerusalem. Jerusalem was a divided city; the front ran through its center separating Jerusalem into East held by Jordan and West held by Israel. East Jerusalem was captured in one of the most savage battles of the war involving artillery, armor, infantry and hand-to-hand combat. Finally, the Old City was encircled and the last Jordanian were troops trapped inside. The military were waiting for instructions. A cabinet meeting was held in the air-raid shelter of the Knesset. The cabinet deliberated the capture of the Old City, knowing that in order to protect the holy places it would have to be captured street by street and the battle would be very costly. The order was given to commence the attack. Would an Israeli victory be canceled by United Nations pressure? All eyes were on the UN Security Council.

No decision had yet been taken about action against Syria. While Prime Minister Eshkol visited the area, Eban received a call from a high U.S. official who hinted that it would be illogical if the war were to end with the Syrians suffering no penalty for having provoked it. This point was also seriously argued by the farmers of the many Kibbutzim who had been subject to Syrian shelling for years. While the fate of the Golan was being debated, Moshe Dayan questioned the move for imminent fear of Soviet involvement. Despite the call for action, Dayan delayed the operation until Saturday gaining time asking, “and what will the Russians say?”

With General Elazar in command of the Northern Front it was decided to go ahead and storm the Golan Heights and silence the guns that had been pounding since the beginning of the hostilities. The attack began on Friday June the ninth. It was an almost impossible mission. The stark hills of the Golan Heights were fortified ten miles deep and defended by artillery, armor, and mine fields. The Syrians had dug themselves in on a massive scale; nevertheless, Israeli tanks and bulldozers began the assent with the infantry following. The frontal attack was successful but the proximity of the Syrian defenses, the aerial bombardment and the frequent hand-to-hand fighting made this one of the bloodiest encounters of the war.

On Saturday the troops pushed on wiping out the last pockets of resistance and by the afternoon the entire Golan Heights were in Israeli hands. In Sinai Israeli troops had continued their advance destroying Egyptian armor and military installations and taking thousands of prisoners. By June 8th all Sinai was in Israeli hands and the blockade of Eilat was ended. The final target, the Suez Canal, had been captured placing astride one of the great water ways of international commerce.

By evening of June the tenth a cease fire had been agreed upon by all parties. The land fell quiet. Israel had lived six unforgettable days. The losses, 750 Israeli soldiers killed, two thousand wounded. Israel now controlled territories four times its previous size and the unbelievable had happened; after nineteen years of absence and after great pain and loss, Israel had returned to the heart of Jerusalem.

After the Six-Day War a mass euphoria engulfed the nation. Israelis began to take in the newly enlarged land of Israel rediscovering sites intimately connected to the Bible. The most dramatic achievement of the Six-Day War was the return to Old Jerusalem and to the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, the symbolic center of the Jewish faith which had been barred to Jews for nineteen years.